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Abstract 
In recent years, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has installed radiation sensors to 
screen cargo containers entering the United States. They are concerned that terrorists 
could use containers to smuggle radiological material into the country and carry out 
attacks with dirty bombs or a nuclear device. Recent studies have questioned the value of 
improving this screening system with new sensor technology. The cost of delays caused 
by frequent false alarms outweighs any reduction in the probability of an attack in an 
expected cost analysis. We extend existing methodology in three ways to demonstrate 
how additional factors affect the value of screening investments. We examine the effect 
that screening has in discouraging terrorists. We model multiple levels of screening. 
Finally, we consider additional objectives beyond cost. We find that the conclusion about 
screening depends on key inputs to the probability model (reflecting uncertainties) and to 
the value function (reflecting the stakeholders’ fundamental objectives). 
Keywords: Applications: Terrorism; Probability: Applications; Multiple Objective 
Decision Analysis. 
1. Introduction 
Terrorist groups are trying to obtain radiological material to attack targets inside the 
United States with radioactive dispersal devices, or dirty bombs (Gardner 2003). One 
method for smuggling radiological material into the United States is a container. 
Containers and container ships carry about 90% of non-bulk goods worldwide (Ebeling 
2009). 20.4 million containers enter the United States each year (Bonner 2005). US 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens these containers looking for smuggled 
radiological materials. A radiation portal monitor (RPM) scans the container for 
radioactive sources. If the RPM detects radiation then CBP performs further screening or 
physically inspects the container. Additional inspection uses gamma ray and x-ray 
scanners. CBP personnel use radioactive isotope identification devices for a physical 
inspection. We study these critical screening and inspection decisions using decision 
analysis and extend previous work to determine which inputs to the decision structure, 
probability model, and value model are critical in determining whether and how to screen 
containers. 
Decision analysis has been used widely in counter-terrorism decisions, including 
ranking critical infrastructures to protect (Haimes et al. 2002, Apostolakis and Lemon 
2005), learning from multiple sources of intelligence information (Paté-Cornell  2002), 
protecting commercial airlines against missiles (von Winterfeldt and Sullivan 2006), 
determining which bridges to protect (Leung et al. 2004), and determining strategies for 
using Potassium Iodide treatments after exposure to radioactive iodine from a nuclear 
incident (Feng and Keller 2006). Game theory has also been widely applied, including 
general strategy and defense modeling (Kunreuther and Heal 2002, Zhuang and Bier 
2007, Bier et al. 2007b, Zhuang et al. 2007) and specific applications, such as protecting 
power transmission systems (Bier et al. 2007a) and commercial airlines (Heal and 
Kunreuther 2005). Decision analysis has proved useful in modeling the sequential nature 
of these decisions and the uncertainties inherent in them. Game theory has proved useful 
in modeling the action and counter-action of the terrorist and counter-terrorist, including 
the ability to catch terrorists with secret defenses and deter terrorists with revealed 
defenses. Paté-Cornell and Guikema (2002) and Bier (2007) combine decision analysis 
and game theory to model both uncertainty and the action and counter-action of the 
opposing sides. Rios Insua et al. (2009) give an overview of this work and the issue of 
modeling terrorist decisions directly with game theory versus modeling the uncertainty 
about their actions with a probability distribution. 
Several studies have looked at improving the screening process for containers 
with operations research methods. Lewis et al. (2003) look at the inspection problem 
faced by major “hub” container ports, like Singapore. These ports must screen containers 
as they pass through on the way to their destination port. Lewis et al. develop algorithms 
for minimizing delays while inspecting a given percentage of containers. Ramirez-
Marquez (2007) consider a combination of different types of sensors, developing 
inspection strategies that minimize inspection cost while maintaining stated detection 
rates. Madigan et al. (2007) develop algorithms for selecting the optimal sequence of 
sensors and the optimal signal threshold for each sensor beyond which inspectors should 
take further action. Bakir (2008) considers a more specific problem, how best to protect 
the US-Mexican border. The options include screening on the Mexican side of the border 
and implementing other general security measures. Bakir’s analysis includes the choice 
on the US side of the border between new Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP) and 
existing RPMs.  
Bakir (2008) provides a wealth of probability and cost estimates. For instance, we 
would have to screen 10 billion containers to detect four true threats. However, we would 
also detect 249,999,996 naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) sources, which 
are regular goods that give off radiation. Examples include ceramic tile and irradiated 
iron. Inspecting containers because of NORM sources is costly and delays the cargo. 
Bakir (2008) concludes that CBP should not implement new ASP technology. We 
examine whether even the original screening investments are worthwhile. We consider 
several extensions to Bakir’s analysis and examine whether these extensions could 
potentially change the conclusions about screening.  
 Firstly, we consider the effect that screening has in deterring nuclear smuggling in 
containers. Radiological material is hard to get. Container transportation is only one 
avenue for smuggling it into the country; other avenues include freight vessels, air cargo, 
and private boats and aircraft. Terrorist groups will choose the method and route that give 
the best chance of getting the radiological material through. If CBP screens containers 
and does not screen the other avenues, terrorists will be less likely to use a container. 
However, the reverse of this argument is also true. If CBP does not screen containers, 
terrorists will be more likely to choose them. Thus, screening provides a deterrence 
effect. We examine the effect of deterrence on the screening decision and determine how 
large the effect needs to be before screening becomes cost-effective.   
 Secondly, we consider multiple levels of screening. Bakir (2008) assumes that if 
CBP screens a container and an alarm sounds, then they will perform an inspection. Does  
CBP learn enough from an alarm to justify inspection? Examining the expected costs 
suggests the answer is no. The probability of a false alarm is much higher than the 
probability of a threat. One option for obtaining more information is to perform multiple 
levels of screening. We analyze this option with existing screening technology. To model 
multiple levels of screenings accurately, we consider the occurrence of both threats and 
NORM sources and their relative probabilities of causing alarms. We extend the analysis 
to determine how many times CBP should screen a given container.  
 Lastly, we include additional objectives in the screening decision. Bakir (2008) 
performs a thorough expected-cost analysis. Keeney (2007) suggests other objectives for 
counter terrorism decisions. We include objectives relevant to the screening decision in a 
value model. We find that the number of levels of screening depends heavily on the 
parameters of the value model that reflect stakeholder preferences. 
  We note that the techniques used herein are well developed. However, these 
simple extensions shed new light on this critical decision. Section 2 outlines the part of 
the analysis in Bakir (2008) we focus on, namely the decision whether to screen 
containers entering the United States. In Section 3, we extend the analysis to examine 
how large the deterrence effect must be before screenings become worthwhile. We 
consider the decision to perform multiple levels of screening in Section 4. Section 5 adds 
additional objectives to the analysis through a multi-attribute value function. We draw 
conclusions in Section 6 and provide recommendations for further research on this 
problem. 
2. The Basic Screening Decision 
Figure 1 shows a decision tree for deciding whether CBP should screen containers. One 
option is to screen the container with current radiation portal monitors and then decide 
whether to inspect it. The other option is to decide whether to inspect the container 
without screening. The decision is applicable to all containers entering the US. We use 
parameter values from Bakir (2008) in our decision. In the following, we use the term 
threat for radiological material smuggled in a container. 
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Figure 1. A decision tree for the container-screening problem with one screening. 
 
 When a container arrives at a port, CBP has the decision whether to screen it. If 
CBP screens the container, then either the alarm sounds, or it does not. Then CBP has the 
decision to inspect the container or to allow it through. Note that we are not assuming 
that CBP will automatically inspect the container if an alarm sounds. Instead, we consider 
the conditions under which the information gained from an alarm is sufficient to justify 
inspection. CBP must make this same inspection decision if they choose not to perform 
screening, but without the additional information provided by the RPM. If CBP inspects 
the container then there is a chance that a threat will be found. If CBP does not inspect 
the container, or if they find nothing during an inspection, they allow it to pass through, 
and we observe whether there is an attack. We calculate the probability of an attack from 
the probability that there is a threat inside the container and the probability that CBP does 
not find the threat during an inspection. It also incorporates the probability that law 
enforcement agencies do not stop the attack once inside the country.  
 Several critical parameters and events drive the decision. We denote the event that 
a threat is inside any given container by T  and the event that an alarm sounds by S . We 
use the over-score notation for the complement of each event. F denotes the event that 
CBP finds a threat during the inspection of a container and A  denotes the event that an 
attack occurs. In terms of probabilities, we must define: 
• the probability of a threat being inside a given container ( Tp ) 
• the probability of an alarm or signal if there is a threat in the container (true 
alarm, |S Tp ) 
• the probability of an alarm or signal if there is not a threat in the container (false 
alarm, |S Tp ) 
• the probability of finding the threat upon inspection ( |F Tp ) 
• the probability of an attack if there is a threat in a container that is passed through 
( |A Tp ) 
In terms of costs, we must define: 
• the average cost of screening each container ( Sc ), the average cost of inspecting a 
container ( Ic ) 
• the cost of containing and disposing of radiological materials discovered in a 
container ( Fc ) 
• the cost of an attack ( Ac ) 
 Table 1 shows three values of each parameter, a base value, as well as a minimum 
and maximum value. We base the values in Table 1 on those given in Bakir (2008). 
 
Table 1. The base, minimum, and maximum values of the parameters for the 
container decision problem. 
Parameter Minimum Base Value Maximum 
Sc  $0 $6 $40 
Ic  $0 $600 $1,000 
Fc  $0 $100,000 $500,000 
Ac  $10 Billion $40 Billion $100 Billion 
Tp  5x10
-11
 5x10-10 5x10-9 
|S Tp  0.6 0.8 1 
|S Tp  0.01 0.025 0.1 
|F Tp  0.1 0.9 1 
|A Tp  0.1 0.5 1 
 The General Accounting Office (GAO) performed an analysis of the cost and 
efficacy of container screening. Their report (GAO 2006) states that the cost of installing 
and maintaining radiation detection equipment over the next 10 years is $1.2 billion. 
Bakir (2008) uses this value as their cost basis. During the 10-year life cycle, 204 million 
containers will enter the country, if current cargo volumes remain constant. This gives an 
average cost of approximately $6 per container. Our use of an average cost does not 
allow for discounts if CBP implements screening more widely. However, we use a 
minimum value of $0 to test if this cost is a driving factor in the screening decision. 
Recently, the GAO has updated the total cost to $3.1 billion over the next ten years (GAO 
2008). We use a maximum value of $40 per container to account for further increases and 
to allow for the use of new technology. The cost of inspection includes both direct costs 
and the cost of cargo delays. Bakir (2008) estimates this cost to be $600 per container. 
The maximum value for this is $1,000 per container, and we use $0 as the minimum 
value again.  
 The containment and removal of radiological material found during an inspection 
will require specialized personnel and equipment. Previous studies have not considered 
such costs. We estimate this cost at $100,000, but with a range from $0 to $500,000. This 
cost actually implies a penalty for finding radiological material during the inspection. 
However, it is a real cost and is much lower than the cost of an attack. 
 We assume that the attack uses a radioactive dispersal device (RDD). A more 
common name for an RDD is a dirty bomb. An RDD uses a standard explosive device to 
scatter radioactive material. It does less damage than a nuclear bomb, but it is less 
difficult to build. De Rugy (2007), Bronskill and Bailey (2007), and Rosoff and von 
Winterfeldt (2007) each assessed the total cost of an RDD attack. Bakir aggregated their 
estimates to obtain a base value of $40 billion and a range from $10 billion to $100 
billion.  
 Bakir (2008) estimates a probability of 0.1 that there will be an attempt in the next 
10 years to smuggle radiological material inside a container entering the US. 204 million 
containers will enter the US in that period. The probability that there is a threat inside any 
given one is 5x10-10. We vary this probability between 5x10-11 to 5x10-9. Bakir estimates 
the probability of an attack at 0.855 given that a threat is successfully smuggled into the 
country. Discussion with intelligence officials suggests that this could be high. We set the 
probability to 0.5. The probability is the same if we do not inspect, or if we inspect and 
do not find the threat ( | | ,AT AT Fp p= ). There can be no attack if inspectors find and contain 
the threat, so | ,AT Fp  is zero. We vary the attack probability from 0.1 to 1. Bakir estimates 
the probability of finding a threat hidden inside a container during the inspection to be 
0.9. We vary this probability from 0.1 to 1.  
 Bakir (2008) gives a true alarm rate of 80% and a false alarm rate of 2.5% based 
on current technology. The minimum values considered are 60% true alarms and 1% 
false alarms. The maximum values considered are 100% true alarms and 10% false 
alarms. Given these input values, we must calculate the probabilities required for the 
decision tree. Firstly, we must calculate the probability of an alarm signal ( Sp ). We use 
the law of total probability, conditioning on whether there is a threat in the container, 
specifically | |S S T T S T Tp p p p p= + . The base value of Sp  is 3.13 x10
-4
. 
 The remaining probabilities also depend on the probability of a threat (5x10-10 at 
the base value). We must find the probability of a threat given the outcome of the 
screening, specifically given an alarm signal 
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At the base parameter values, |T Sp  is 1.6x10
-8
 (alarm signal) and |T Sp  is 1x10-10 (no 
alarm signal).  
 We must calculate the probability of an attack ( Ap ), the probability of an attack 
given an alarm signal ( |A Sp ), and the probability of an attack given no alarm signal 
( |A Sp ). These probabilities can be calculated using |A AT Tp p p=  (2.5x10-10 at the base 
values), | | |A S A T T Sp p p=  (8.05x10-9 at the base values), and || |ATA S T Sp p p=  (5.00x10-11 at 
the base values).  
 Lastly, we must calculate the probability of finding a threat upon inspection ( Fp ), 
the probability of finding a threat upon inspection given an alarm signal on screening 
( |F Sp ), and the probability of finding a threat upon inspection given no alarm signal on 
screening ( |F Sp ). These probabilities can be calculated using |F F T Tp p p=  (4.5x10-10 at 
the base values), | | |F S F T T Sp p p=  (1.45x10-8 at the base values), and || |F TF S T Sp p p=  
(9.00x10-11 at the base values). 
 Figure 2 shows the solution of the decision tree in Figure 1 using the base values 
for the probabilities and costs. The optimal decision is not to screen. Figure 2 shows that 
the probability of a threat increases when an alarm sounds, but not enough to justify 
screening. Bakir points out that the main reason for this is the rate of false alarms. The 
probability of an alarm is 0.025 at the base values. This includes both true alarms and 
false alarms, but how many of each? The probability of a threat is only 5x10-10 and 90% 
of these would lead to an alarm. This means that four in 10 billion containers would 
contain a threat that causes an alarm, while 249,999,996 of them would contain a NORM 
source that causes an alarm. Thus, most alarms are false. Figure 2 shows that even when 
the alarm sounds, CBP should not inspect the container, as the alarm is likely to be false. 
If it is not worth inspecting containers when the alarm sounds then it is not worth 
screening. We could also say that the expected value of information from screening is 
less than the cost of screening. 
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Figure 2. The solution for the container-screening problem with one screening. 
3. The Effect of Deterrence  
Thus far, we have implicitly assumed that terrorist groups will attempt to smuggle 
radiological material in containers, whether CBP screens them or not. This is because we 
have assumed that the probability of a threat is the same in either case. However, it is 
reasonable to assume that screening will influence terrorist groups’ decisions. We hope 
that it will deter them from using containers for smuggling radiological material. CBP is 
the decision maker in this situation and to CBP the actions of terrorist groups are 
uncertainties. Thus, we model the deterrence effect of increased screening as a change in 
the probability of a threat.  
 Bakir (2008) estimates a specific change in the probability. The change represents 
the decision maker’s beliefs about how screening will affect the terrorist group’s 
decisions. Estimating the exact value of this change is a difficult judgment task for 
intelligence experts. We could consider it unknowable, rather than just unknown. Instead, 
we introduce a parameter to represent the change in threat probability. Bakir 
subsequently performed a sensitivity analysis on the change in probability. We suggest 
that one should start with a sensitivity analysis to find the parameter value at which the 
optimal decision changes. Then the decision maker only needs to judge which side of this 
value the parameter lies on, rather than attempting to estimate the parameter directly.   
 We let d  be a deterrence multiplier that captures the ratio of the threat 
probabilities when CBP screen containers and when it does not. Given that we are 
modeling a decision without intelligence information specific to a container, our decision 
reflects the choice to screen all containers. Thus, the terrorists know about the choice to 
screen before initiating their attack. If we denote the decision to perform the screening 
process by P , then || T PT Pp dp= . Bakir (2008) used the values of the threat probability in 
Section 2 for the choice to keep existing screening technology. Thus, we use these values 
for |T Pp  when CBP screens containers. In Figure 1, the upper branch of the screening 
decision node represents the choice to screen and then to decide whether to inspect. The 
lower branch represents the choice not to screen, but still to decide whether to inspect. d  
represents the change in threat probability for the upper branch in comparison to the 
lower branch. Thus, we know that 1d ≥  as screening with possible inspection will have 
more of a deterrence effect than just possible inspection. Using this assumption, we 
obtain similar expressions for the probability of an attack and the probability of finding a 
threat upon inspection, namely || A PA Pp dp=  and || F PF Pp dp= .  
 Figure 3 shows the expected cost of screening and the expected cost of not 
screening. The expected cost of screening is higher than the expected cost of not 
screening when 1d = . This is the situation represented in Figure 2. The expected cost of 
not screening increases linearly with d . The expected costs of screening and not 
screening are equal when 1.6d =  and the expected cost of not screening exceeds that of 
screening for 1.6d > . Thus, our analysis shows that if the probability that a terrorist 
group will attempt such nuclear smuggling increases by 60% or more if we do not screen, 
then the lower cost option is to screen. Note that this calculation uses the base values of 
the parameters.  
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Figure 3. The expected cost of screening and not screening for varying levels of 
deterrence multiplier d   
 In summary, adding deterrence to our analysis can change the final 
recommendation. Thus, actually finding smuggled radiological materials is not the only 
reason to screen containers. This approach to modeling deterrence is simple for the basic 
screening decision, but it will be useful as we extend the model. The reader will note that 
the screening decision in Figure 1 has only two alternatives: screen or not. In practice, 
random inspections are often used when not screening. Randomly inspecting a percentage 
of containers would provide a deterrence effect and reduce the cost compared to the 
choice of inspecting all containers. However, this would mean that we would need to 
model a deterrence effect that depends on the proportion of containers screened, an even 
more complex judgment task. Thus, decision analysis is limited in this respect compared 
to game theory. Future work will address this limitation. 
4. The Effect of Multiple Screenings 
Screening may be economically viable if we take the effect of deterrence into account. 
Another way to improve the value of screening is to improve the accuracy of the 
screening process, or more specifically to reduce the false alarm rate. CBP can reduce the 
false alarm rate with improved technology, and such efforts are ongoing. They can also 
reduce it with current technology by performing multiple levels of screening. However, 
the results of two screenings of the same container are dependent. We develop a model 
for the distribution of the results of multiple screenings of a container. 
4.1 A Closer Look at False Alarms 
NORM sources cause most false alarms in nuclear screening. Suppose we screen a 
container and get an alarm, but there is not a threat in the container. If we screen it again, 
there is a high probability that we will get a second alarm. Truly random false alarms 
from extraneous background sources of radiation or equipment errors are rare. False 
alarms from NORM sources inside the container (such as ceramic tiles, irradiated iron, 
and medical equipment) are frequent. Thus, we must extend the probability model from 
Section 2 to model multiple levels of screening.  
 Let N denote the event that there is a NORM source in a given container. Np  is 
then the probability of this event and | ,S N Tp  denotes the probability of an alarm given 
only a NORM source inside the container. We assume that screening equipment detects 
NORM sources as often as it does threats, so our baseline value for | ,S N Tp  is 0.8. From 
Section 2, 2.5% of containers give a false alarm and 80% of NORM sources cause an 
alarm. This implies that 3.125% of containers would have to contain a NORM source or 
0.03125Np =  ( 0.03125 0.8 0.025× = ). We also extend our notation from |S Tp  to | ,S T Np  
to represent the probability of an alarm given that there is a threat in the container, but no 
NORM source. If there is both a threat and a NORM source in the container then each of 
these sources can send off gamma-rays and so each has a chance of independently 
causing an alarm. We calculate | , | , | , | , | ,S T N S T N S T N S T N S T Np p p p p= + −  assuming the 
independence of alarms caused by NORM sources and alarms caused by threats. We 
assume that without a threat or a NORM source, the probability of an alarm ( | ,S T Np ) is 
zero. This assumption ignores false alarms from background radiation or equipment 
errors, but does not affect our calculations.  
 We must first find the probability of alarms caused by the combinations of threats 
and/or NORM sources. We can use simple conditional probability calculations to find the 
probabilities of an alarm given the contents of the container, namely 
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We can then calculate the probability of a threat and/or a NORM source given an alarm, 
specifically 
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The overall probability of a threat given a single alarm is then 
8
| , |, | 1.61 10T S T N ST N Sp p p
−= + = × , 
the same value we obtained in Section 2. However, it is noticeable that the probability of 
a NORM source is almost one. We did update our probability of a threat from the prior 
value of 105 10−×  to the posterior value of 81.61 10−× . Thus, we do increase our belief that 
there is a threat in the container an alarm sounds, but we believe more strongly that a 
NORM source caused the alarm. 
 We use Bayesian updating to learn from multiple levels of screening (Bernado 
and Smith 1994). Suppose we screen a container n  times. Evidently, alarms from 
multiple screenings of a given container are dependent; each alarm depends on the 
contents of the container. If there is a threat and/or a NORM source, then each screening 
has a high probability of sounding an alarm. If there is no threat or NORM source, then 
the probability of an alarm is (effectively) zero for each screening. We assume that the 
occurrences of alarms from n  screenings are exchangeable events when conditioned on 
the contents of the container (Bernado and Smith 1994, chapter 4). Let K  be the number 
of alarms that occur during n  screenings. The conditional exchangeability assumption 
implies that the distribution of K  given the contents of the container is binomial 
(Bernado and Smith 1994, page 223), specifically 
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where | ,S T Np , | ,S T Np , and | ,S T Np  are specified above. We calculate the joint probabilities 
of alarms and container contents by 
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Again, we calculate the posterior probabilities of the contents of the container given K  
alarms as 
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Figure 4 shows the possible posterior probabilities for five levels of screening. It 
is clear from examining Figure 4 that we are confident that there is no threat if there is no 
alarm. If we observe one or more alarms, we become certain that there is a NORM source 
in the container. The prior probability of a threat is much lower than the prior probability 
of a NORM source. The posterior probability of a threat does increase after observing 
one or more alarms. However, it does not increase sufficiently to become confident that a 
threat caused the alarms instead of a NORM source.  
The likelihood functions for K alarms given the contents of the container are 
driven by the probability of an alarm given the radioactive source, namely | ,S T Np  and 
| ,S T Np . Current radiation sensors are as likely to give an alarm for a NORM source as 
they are for a threat. The base values of these probabilities are equal. Thus, inspectors 
cannot differentiate between an alarm from a threat and an alarm from a NORM source. 
We begin with a higher prior probability of a NORM source. We end with a higher 
posterior probability of a NORM source when we observe alarms. So what is the effect of 
screening equipment that can differentiate between threats and NORM sources? 
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Figure 4. The posterior probability of a NORM source and a threat given the 
number of alarms for different levels of screening 
 
Figure 5 repeats the calculations in Figure 4 with three different values of | ,S T Np , 
namely 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01. These values illustrate the effect of differentiating between 
threats and NORM sources. We are confident that there is a threat only when | ,S T Np = 
0.01 and there are four or five alarms. An increase in the accuracy of the screening 
equipment for detecting threats ( | ,S T Np ) gives the same conclusion.  
These calculations allow us to draw two conclusions. The first is that we must 
differentiate between threats and NORM sources before we can derive any certainty that 
there is a threat in the container. The second is that we need multiple levels of screening 
to become certain that there is a threat. This is because our prior probability of a threat is 
much lower than our prior probability of a NORM source. However, the cost of an attack 
is much greater than the cost of an inspection that only reveals a NORM source. Thus, we 
must determine how many levels of screening are cost effective and again consider the 
deterrence effect. 
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Figure 5. The posterior probabilities of threats and NORM source for varying 
probabilities of alarms given NORM sources given five levels of screening.  
| , 0.1S T Np =
| , 0.05S T Np =
| , 0.01S T Np =
4.2 How Many Levels of Screening Should We Perform? 
Figure 6 shows an influence diagram for deciding the number of levels of screening to 
perform. It represents a one-time decision, not a sequential one. Although deciding 
whether to screen again based on the results of earlier screenings may be desirable, it is 
not practical. CBP passes the containers through the RPMs on a rail car or a truck bed. 
Constructing a pathway to divert a container if an RPM does not give an alarm would use 
valuable space at the container port. We assume that CBP passes the containers through 
each RPM one after another.  
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Figure 6. An influence diagram of the decision of how many levels of screening to 
perform. 
 
We also assume that CBP does not use the same RPM each time. This would take 
too much time and would produce dependencies in the results beyond those modeled in 
Section 4.3. We must have multiple RPMs to perform multiple levels of screening. This 
allows for the possibility of different types of screening equipment that can search for 
different types of threats and filter out NORM sources. We do not examine such 
possibilities here though.  
Figure 7 shows the expected cost of no screening and one through five levels of 
screening. The deterrence multiplier ( d ) varies from 1 to 5. We assume that the level of 
deterrence is the same for any number of levels of screening. Increasing the number of 
screening machines would add equipment at the location of the screening. However, it is 
not obvious that this would increase the caution of terrorists attempting to smuggle 
radiological material. We must also admit that this is a simplifying assumption. As we 
have already stated, it is difficult, if not even unwise, to estimate the exact value of d . 
Introducing additional deterrence parameters for two through five levels of screening 
would exacerbate the estimation problem.  
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Figure 7. The expected cost of not screening and of performing from one to five 
levels of screening for varying levels of deterrent multiplier 
The expected cost for one level of screening and no screening in Figure 7 are 
identical to those in Figure 3. These lines still intersect at d =1.6. However, the expected 
cost of two through five levels of screening increases with the additional cost of 
screening equipment. Screening is not economically viable if 1.6d < . If 1.6d ≥ , then 
CBP should perform only one level of screening when we set the parameters to their base 
values. The purpose of this screening is purely deterrence, as the container is not 
inspected even with an alarm signal. In fact, the container is not inspected even with five 
alarm signals as the posterior probabilities in Figure 4 show that the cause is most likely a 
NORM source. In the next section, we will examine whether this changes with | ,S T Np  at 
0.01 . 
In summary, at our base parameter values, we do not screen if we believe that the 
deterrence effect is small ( 1.6d < ) and we screen only once if we believe the deterrence 
effect is large enough ( 1.6d ≥ ).  
4.3 Sensitivity to Parameter Values 
The baseline analysis of multiple levels of screening leaves several critical questions. 
What if we can avoid alarms for NORM sources? Does this affect the economic 
calculation? Would additional levels of screening be advisable if the equipment was 
better at detecting a threat? What other parameters affect the decision?  
Table 2. The decision to inspect and threat probability based on the number of 
levels of screening performed and the number of alarms observed. 
Number of Levels of Screening 
Number of Alarms 0 1 2 3 4 5 
0 
Don’t Inspect 
5.00x10-10 
Don’t Inspect 
1.00x10-10 
Don’t Inspect 
2.00x10-12 
Don’t Inspect 
4.00x10-13 
Don’t Inspect 
8.00x10-13 
Don’t Inspect 
1.60x10-13 
1  
Don’t Inspect 
1.28x10-6 
Don’t Inspect 
2.59x10-7 
Don’t Inspect 
5.22x10-8 
Don’t Inspect 
1.05x10-8 
Don’t Inspect 
2.13x10-9 
2   
Don’t Inspect 
1.02x10-4 
Don’t Inspect 
2.07x10-5 
Don’t Inspect 
4.18x10-6 
Don’t Inspect 
8.44x10-7 
3    
Inspect 
0.0081 
Inspect 
0.0017 
Inspect 
3.34x10-4 
4     
Inspect 
0.3960 
Inspect 
0.1169 
5      
Inspect 
0.9813 
 
 
As we have seen in Section 4.1, we obtain higher posterior probabilities of a 
threat from multiple alarms if NORM sources do not trigger alarms as often. To test this 
effect we re-created the analysis in Figure 7 setting | , 0.01S T Np = . The change did not 
affect the expected costs for not screening and one level of screening. The expected costs 
for two through five levels of screening decrease when | , 0.01S T Np = , but not enough to 
justify these levels of screening. Thus, even with the lower value of | ,S T Np , the decision 
remains not to screen if 1.6d <  and to screen once if 1.6d ≥ . However, Table 2 shows 
the result of the inspection decision for zero to five levels of screening with the 
corresponding posterior threat probability with | ,S T Np  at 0.01 . We can see that CBP 
should not inspect the container if they screen less than three times, no matter how many 
alarms they get. If they screen three times, they should only inspect if they get alarms 
each time. If they screen four times, they should only inspect if they get three or four 
alarms. If they screen five times then they should only inspect if they get three, four, or 
five alarms. Thus, the inspection decisions are affected by | ,S T Np  for three or more levels 
of screening, but three or more alarms occur so infrequently that this does not affect the 
overall screening decision.  
Holding | ,S T Np  at 0.01 , we also increased the probability of detecting a threat in a 
container | ,S T Np  to its maximum value. Again, we do not change our decision from that 
obtained when these parameters are set to their base values. Thus, improving the 
sensitivity of screening devices does not change our conclusions about screening.  
We now consider the sensitivity of this analysis to other parameters. Setting the 
prior threat probability to its maximum level changes the ranking of alternatives, as does 
setting the cost of screening to its minimum level. Setting the probability of an attack if 
the threat gets through to its maximum level and setting the cost of an attack to its 
maximum level both change the expected costs, but do not change the ranking of 
alternatives. The cost of inspection, the cost of finding a threat on inspection and the 
probability of finding a threat upon inspection do not significantly affect the expected 
cost of each alternative. 
Figure 8 shows the same calculations as Figure 7, but with the threat probability 
( |T Pp ) set at its maximum value, ten times the base value. Figure 8 shows that screening 
either four or five times is better than not screening with a higher threat probability. The 
size of the deterrent effect does not matter. The best alternative is five levels of screening. 
In fact, this is true for values of |T Pp  below the maximum value. When the threat 
probability reaches 6.36 times the baseline value, five levels of screening becomes the 
best alternative.  
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Figure 8. The expected cost for zero to five levels of screening for varying levels of 
deterrent effect with the maximum threat probability 
The other parameter that changes the ranking of alternatives is the cost of 
screening. Figure 9 shows the same calculations as Figure 7, but with free screening. The 
optimal decision in Figure 9 is five levels of screening. Again, five levels of screening are 
best for costs above the minimum (free). Below 69¢ per container, it is better to perform 
five levels of screening even if there is no deterrence effect. 
The cost of an attack ( Ac ) changes the expected cost values, but does not change 
the ranking of alternatives. The same is true for the probability of an attack ( |A Tp ). 
However, these parameters do change the effect of deterrence on the decision. The 
baseline values of these parameters are Ac = $40 billion and | 0.5A Tp = . At these values 
one level of screening is preferred if 1.6d ≥ . If we increase Ac to $100 billion, then we 
only require that 1.24d ≥ . If we decrease Ac to $10 billion, then not screening is 
preferred unless 3.4d ≥ . For the probability of an attack, the maximum and minimum 
values are | 1ATp =  and | 0.1A Tp =  and these correspond to deterrence effects in the range 
of 1.3d ≥  and 4d ≥  respectively for one level of screening to be preferred to no 
screening. 
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Figure 9. The expected cost for zero to five levels of screening for varying levels of 
deterrent effect with free screening 
 
In summary, the threat probability and the attack cost are the most influential 
parameters in this decision. Set at their maximum levels, screening five times is the 
option with the lowest expected cost. However, we will see in the next section that we 
should consider attributes other than cost in making this decision. 
5. Considering Additional Objectives  
Keeney (2007) proposes that decision makers should consider values and objectives in 
the analysis of counterterrorism decisions. Keeney developed fourteen attributes for 
evaluating the outcomes of such decisions. Six attributes are costs, namely 
• direct and indirect costs to individuals 
• direct and indirect costs to businesses 
• direct and indirect costs to the government.  
Three other attributes are counts of the effect of the attack on individuals, namely 
• the numbers of deaths caused by the attack 
• the number of victims disabled by the attack 
• the number of jobs lost because of the attack 
These measure the effect of the attack on the victims, both directly and indirectly. The 
five other attributes are less obvious, including  
• the effect on recruitment of future terrorists 
• the number of dollars flowing to support terrorism 
• the level of political support for US actions to counter terrorism 
• the number of US citizens experiencing limits to their freedom 
• the number of citizens experiencing fear and despair 
Thus far, we have measured the effects of an attack by their cost. Bakir (2008) 
gives a range for the cost of an attack. This range is an aggregation of estimates from 
previous studies. Each study considers attributes suggested by Keeney. For instance, the 
total costs in Rosoff and von Winterfeldt (2007) include the number of fatalities, the 
number of cancers caused by radiation exposure, the cost of evacuation, the cost of 
decontamination, and the cost of lost business and lowered property values. It is possible 
to model each of these attributes individually and perform a value tradeoff. Rosoff and 
von Winterfeldt (2007) implicitly makes a value trade-off in the assumption that each 
human life is equivalent to a cost of $5 million. However, as Bakir (2008) aggregates 
multiple studies to get the total cost, we do not know the corresponding values of each 
attribute. Instead, we include all but the last five of Keeney’s attributes above in the one 
total cost attribute.  
Do we need to include any of the remaining five attributes? Some terrorism-
related decisions affect support for US policies and limit the freedom of citizens. 
However, screening containers is not a politically sensitive issue and its effect is 
commercial, not individual. Successful attacks cause fear and despair, but we can 
represent this through an increase in the cost of an attack. We have already performed 
such a sensitivity analysis.  
This leaves us to consider effects on the recruitment of future terrorists and 
monetary support for terrorism. One may think that for our decision, only a successful 
attack will affect these attributes. However, if CBP finds radiological material in a 
container during an inspection, then this could negatively affect terrorist support in terms 
of both money and recruitment. Thus, we should also consider changes in support for 
terrorists caused by the outcomes of the screening decision. 
5.1 A Simple Two Attribute Value Function for the Screening Decision 
Our analysis will use two attributes, the total cost of an attack ( 1x ) and the effect on 
support for terrorist groups ( 2x ).We use a constructed scale (Clemen and Reilly 2001, ch. 
4) for terrorist support. If an attack is successful, we set 2 1x = + . This represents an 
increase in terrorist support. If CBP finds a threat upon inspection, thereby stopping the 
attack, then we set 2 1x = − . This represents a decrease in terrorist support. If terrorist 
support is neither increased nor decreased from the current level of support, then we set 
2 0x = .  
We assume a linear-additive value function (Keeney and Raiffa 1976, ch. 3; 
Kirkwood 1997, ch. 4), where 
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2( , ) ( ) ( )v x x w v x w v x= +  
and 1 2 1w w+ = . A value function represents the decision maker’s preferences over these 
two attributes. We could also use a utility function and represent the decision maker’s 
aversion to risk. The simple additive form above is unlikely to be sufficient to model risk 
aversion over these two attributes. Thus, we use a value function to keep the form simple 
for this demonstration of the approach. The value function for 2x  is simple and represents 
our objective to minimize terrorist support. We set 2 ( 1) 0v + = , as this is the worst 
outcome. We set 2 ( 1) 1v − = , as this is the best outcome. Lastly, we set 2 (0)v a= . We use 
the parameter a   to show whether preferences are stronger for avoiding an increase in 
terrorist support or for achieving a decrease in terrorist support. If a  is above 0.5  then a 
increase in terrorist support from a successful attack is more important than a decrease in 
terrorist support from finding smuggled radiological material. If a  is below 0.5  then a 
decrease in terrorist support from finding smuggled radiological material is more 
important than the increase in terrorist support from a successful attack1. At the extremes, 
if a  is 1 then an increase in terrorist support is important, but a decrease is not. If a  is 0  
then a decrease in terrorist support is important, but an increase is not.  
For 1x , we  use a proportional scoring value function (Clemen and Reilly 2001, 
ch. 15), specifically 
max
1 1
1 1 max min
1 1
( ) x xv x
x x
−
=
−
, 
where max1x =$100,000,000,630 (the maximum cost of a successful attack even after 
inspection and five levels of screening) and min1x =0 (the cost if we do not screen or 
inspect and either there is no threat or the attack is not successful). Thus max1 1( ) 0v x =  and 
min
1 1( ) 1v x =  as we wish to minimize the total cost.  
 The analysis now depends on the value of 1w  (as 2 11w w= − ) and a . In the next 
section, we will perform a sensitivity analysis to determine how 1w  and a  affect the 
optimal decision. 
5.2 Results of the Two Attribute Analysis 
Figure 10 shows a strategy chart indicating the alternative with highest expected value at 
each combination of 1w  and a  between 0 and 1. Let us first consider the extreme 
combinations of these two parameters. We will then discuss what happens at the non-
                                                 
1
 Imagine a decision maker faced with a choice of A. going from an increase in terrorist support from a 
successful attack ( 2 1x = + ) to the current levels ( 2 0x = ) or B. going from the current level ( 2 0x = ) to 
a decrease in terrorist support ( 2 1x = − ) by finding the threat by inspection. If the DM prefers Af B then 
the preference difference (from an increase to the current level) a > 0.5 . If the DM prefers Bf A then the 
preference difference (from the current level to a decrease) 1 a− > 0.5 , so a < 0.5 . 
extreme combinations. In this analysis, we set | , 0.01S T Np =  as discussed in Sections 4.1 
and 4.3.  
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Figure 10. A strategy chart showing the optimal number of levels of screening for 
values of 1w  and a  
 
When 1 1w = , the analysis is the same as the purely cost based analysis. 
When 1 0w = , we are only basing the decision on the importance of increases and 
decreases in terrorist support. When 0a =  (and 1 0w = ) then only decreases in terrorist 
support from finding smuggled material are important. When 1a =  (and 1 0w = ) then 
only increases in terrorist support from a successful attack are important. If 10 1w< <  and 
0 1a< <  then each of these outcomes affects the analysis and their interplay causes 
interesting dynamics in the optimal decision. 
There are two dynamics at play in Figure 10. The first occurs as the value of 
increases in terrorist support from successful attacks becomes high enough (to the top-left 
of Figure 10). We reach a point where the best decision changes from no screening to 
five levels of screening. When a  is high enough and 1w  is low enough, the decision 
maker’s preference against increases from terrorist support from successful attacks is 
high. Thus, stopping the attacks is most important and the best option is five levels of 
screening.  
Below this threshold of a  and 1w , the decision is based on how important it is to 
decrease terrorist support by finding smuggled threats. When 1 1w = , we are considering 
only total cost in the analysis. Then we obtain the same result as our purely cost-based 
analysis and choose not to screen (we are not considering the effect of deterrence yet). As 
we scan from the right of Figure 10 to the bottom-left, the optimal number of levels of 
screening increases. For  a  and 1w  near zero, we choose higher numbers of levels of 
screening. 
One final observation is an effect at the origin. When 0a =  and 1 0w = , the only 
outcome that matters is decreasing terrorist support by finding smuggled threats. In this 
special case, the best decision is to inspect every container, as cost is not important 
( 1 0w = ). However, if we increase either a  or 1w  by as little as 0.0001, we choose five 
levels of screening. Thus, this is a special case at the origin only. 
The analysis represented in Figure 10 assumes no deterrence effect (or 1d = ). 
Recall for the purely economic decision, if 1.6d ≥  then the best decision would be to 
perform one level of screening. Next, we re-created the strategy plot from Figure 10, but 
setting 2d = . Figure 11 puts the strategy plots for 1d =  and 2d =  side by side for 
comparison. The values of 1w  and a  for which the best decision is not to screen when 
1d = , switch to screen once when 2d =  due to the effect of deterrence. The best 
decisions for other values of 1w  and a  are mostly unaffected by the switch from 1d =  to 
2d = , except near the origin.  
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Figure 11. A strategy chart showing the optimal number of levels of screening for 
values of 1w  and 2 (0)v a=  when 1d =  vs. 2d =  
 
Recall that with 1d =  we had a special case at the origin (when 0a =  and 
1 0w = ) where we would choose no screening. This area increases when 2d = . Close to 
the origin, the value of decreasing terrorist support by finding nuclear threats is high. 
With an increased deterrence effect, the threat probability increases when not screening. 
This makes the chance of finding radiological material upon inspection higher. Thus, 
when 2d = , the region where the optimal decision is to inspect every container covers a 
larger area around the origin, rather than just at the origin with no deterrent effect ( 1d = ). 
We note, however, that while this decision near the origin is of mathematical interest, 
setting 0a =  and 1 0w =  is not realistic. Thus, this effect is of little practical interest. 
2d =1d =
For realistic values of 1w  and a , Figure 11 indicates that screening  (at least one 
level) should be performed even if the deterrence effect is small ( 2d = ). This suggests 
that we should not just look at the cost of the screening process and the cost of attacks. 
We should also consider the second-order effects of outcomes on future terrorist plans. 
In Section 4.3, we examined the influence of key parameters on the purely cost-
based decision. Do these parameters still influence our decision when we consider two 
attributes? 
Figure 12 shows a comparison of the strategy charts for two different numerical 
values of | ,S T Np , the probability of an alarm when there is a threat. On the left, we use the 
base case value ( | , 0.8S T Np = ). On the right, we use perfect detection ( | , 1S T Np = ). The 
threshold for five levels of screening moves to the right when | , 1S T Np = . If each of the 
five levels of screening is more accurate, then this threshold is reached for more 
combinations of 1w  and a . Below this threshold, fewer levels of screening are required at 
a given combination of 1w  and a  when | , 1S T Np = ; each level of screening is better at 
finding threats.  
The remaining parameters do not have as much effect on the strategy plot. The 
threshold beyond which five levels of screening are optimal moves to the right if we 
increase the threat probability ( |T Pp ). The same is true for increases to the cost of an 
attack ( Ac ). These changes make attacks either more likely or more costly, making five 
levels of screening more attractive. Changes in the probability of an alarm from a NORM 
source ( | ,S T Np ) and changes in the cost of inspection ( Ic ) do not affect the strategy chart. 
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Figure 12. A strategy chart showing the optimal number of levels of screening for 
values of 1w  and 2 (0)v a=  when | , 0.8S T Np =  vs. | , 1S T Np =  
6. Conclusions and Further Research 
Bakir (2008) recommends that Customs and Border Patrol does not implement new 
advanced spectroscopic portal technology, unless the threat probability or the cost of an 
attack is significantly higher than current best estimates. We examined the investments 
for the original radiation portal monitor technology and found the same to be true. 
However, we performed several extensions of the analysis that can change this 
conclusion. 
Firstly, if we believe that an attempt to smuggle radiological material or nuclear 
devices into the United States is less likely if we screen containers (a deterrence effect), 
then screening can become the recommended decision. This alone could justify 
screening. Bakir gives point estimates of the deterrence effect. We parameterize it and 
find the values at which it changes the decision. This allows the decision maker to 
perform a simpler judgment task. They need only to decide if they believe the deterrence 
| , 0.8S T Np = | , 1S T Np =
effect is smaller or larger than this change-point. They do not need to estimate its actual 
value. 
Secondly, we consider the main reason that screening has such a high cost, false 
alarms. CBP can reduce the false alarm rate by improving screening technology. We 
show that they can also reduce false alarms by performing multiple levels of screening. 
We find that multiple levels of screening do improve the ability to find threats in a 
container. However, the recommended decision remains screening once if the level of the 
deterrence effect is high enough and not screening if the deterrence effect is low in the 
expected cost analysis.  
Our final extension considers objectives beyond those included in Bakir’s 
analysis. We develop a two-attribute value function that includes the total cost and 
changes in support for terrorist groups. We see that the recommendation can vary from 
zero to five levels of screening depending on our preferences over these two attributes. 
We have not elicited the parameters of the value model from decision makers and could 
not publish them if we had. Instead, we show the recommended decision for different 
values of the parameters and allow the decision maker to decide which to use. However, 
this analysis shows that total cost is not sufficient for full evaluation of the decision.  
This paper shows that the decision to screen containers entering the United States 
is complex. The effect of deterrence alone may well justify screening. Moreover, if we 
consider attributes other than the cost, if we consider multiple levels of screening, and if 
we consider improved technology, then an increase in the level of screening can be 
justified. We have also shown that the decision depends heavily on key parameters. There 
is considerable uncertainty about these parameters, so the next step is to model this 
uncertainty explicitly and to model the decision maker’s attitude to risk and uncertainty 
through a utility function rather than a value function (as done in Section 5).  
We should note a limit to our analysis, however. We model the effect of 
deterrence as a decrease in the probability that terrorists will smuggle radiological 
material into the United States inside a container. This treats the actions of terrorists as 
uncertain quantities (Bedford and Cooke 2001, ch. 2) even though they are clever 
enemies. Their decisions about how to smuggle radiological material into the United 
States are not as simple as a choice between smuggling inside a container and abandoning 
their attack. If we make the container choice less appealing, then terrorists will look for 
other methods. Work to model terrorist decisions, US government decisions, and multiple 
methods of entering the United States is ongoing. Parnell et al. (2009) propose an 
influence diagram where the decisions of the US government and a terrorist organization 
are explicitly included, but with opposing objectives. Rios Insua et al. (2009) also 
propose a combination of game theory and decision analysis that could solve this 
problem. We could model the deterrence effect of random inspections with either 
method. These approaches appear promising for further consideration of this critical 
decision.  
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